The NHS in England continues to pursue a policy of separation between the purchasers and providers of services unlike Scotland and Wales which have chosen to pursue a more integrated and planned approach. Purchasers in England in common with purchasing organizations in other countries, whether private or public, face the combined challenge of reduced funding (as a result of the recession, rising unemployment and massive public borrowing) and growing demands, particularly from an ageing population with a higher prevalence of chronic conditions. The challenge for health care purchasers is to obtain better value from the money spent on health care.
The NHS in England has set its purchasers, known as Primary Care Trusts (PCTs) an ambitious goal to be 'world class'. This requires PCTs among other things to manage knowledge and assess needs; prioritise investment; stimulate the market; promote service improvement and innovation; and make sound financial investments. 1 The first year of assessment and recent research 2 suggest that PCTs are weakest in the areas of analysis of need and demand, and market management (both shaping the structure of supply and holding the market to account). In the next assessment period PCTs will be required to demonstrate how they are ensuring the efficiency and effectiveness of spending and prioritising investment across all areas of spending (i.e. not just growth money). 3 The extent to which purchasers are able to make allocative decisions in part rests on their ability to disinvest and to control utilisation.
There remain a number of barriers to the ability of purchasers to get best value. Allowing NHS patients free choice among 'any willing provider' reduces the ability of purchasers to use contracts to limit the volume of services, negotiate favourable deals (where prices are not fixed) or establish pathways and protocols for more effective management of patients (i.e. discharge planning to reduce lengths of stay, admission prevention schemes, etc). Germany and the Netherlands, which have traditionally had 'any willing provider' arrangements are moving to selective contracting and the creation of preferred provider networks, also common in the US. Surprisingly, England is moving in the opposite direction with a commitment to allow patients to choose from any accredited provider willing to supply services at the national tariff, for the majority of elective care. One suggestion to strengthen the position of purchasers in England is to give them flexibility to negotiate prices below tariff.
Another barrier faced by purchasers is information asymmetry. Purchasers often lack information on the costs and benefits of different services, necessary in order to assess value and make disinvestment decisions or compare the performance of alternative providers. They also lack information on the activity levels in providers (at least on a timely and accurate basis). The number of disputed claims between PCTs and providers suggest there is a need to develop better systems of invoice management and utilisation review.
Finally, purchasers also often lack the means of managing demand, particularly controlling referral volumes and activity levels in the acute sector. Approaches adopted elsewhere, such as prior authorisation for specialist to specialist referrals, triage of A & E attendances with diversion to primary care, and assessment of appropriateness of emergency admissions have not been seriously considered in the NHS. If commissioners are to secure value for money, they will need to balance the transaction costs and the potential damage to the patient experience associated with these activities with the benefits.
In common with many other health systems, hospitals in England are paid for activity (although ironically the policy is called 'payment by results'). One objective of practice-based commissioning (the devolution of PCT purchasing budgets to general practices) was to provide stronger incentives to GPs to monitor and where appropriate reduce referrals. This has led to an increase in referral management in primary care although the impact of these arrangements has not yet been evaluated. New methods of reimbursement which align incentives across hospital and community based care and reward efficiency not just within organizations but across the care pathway are needed urgently.
The creation of integrated care organizations has been advocated as one way of overcoming these barriers. 4 In the US, integrated care organizations (ICOs), where the insurer, medical group and hospitals are owned and managed by the same company, overcome some of the problems of information asymmetry, misaligned objectives, and perverse incentives that are characteristic of the mainstream US health system. ICO pilots in England are supposed to demonstrate the potential of integration within the NHS but they are on a small-scale. Before this approach is pursued more vigorously more substantial pilots are needed that could demonstrate the value or otherwise of this approach. All providers need to find innovative ways of working more effectively across organizational boundaries, particularly in the care of older people and those with chronic conditions where admission to hospital is often a failure of care.
At the same time it is important to provide incentives for purchasers to improve their own performance. In the US where data on insurer performance is published, it has generally been seen as a means of informing consumers about their choices. In England PCTs are subject to a number of assessments. Strategic Health Authorities are responsible for ensuring that PCTs achieve the standards of World Class Commissioning. PCTs are also assessed by the quality regulator (the Care Quality Commission) and assessed jointly with local government as part of the comprehensive area assessment. There is a danger of regulatory overload and a lack of clarity about to whom PCTs are accountable.
If PCTs fail to fulfil their duties as purchasers, the board can be replaced, some of the functions can be outsourced or the PCT can be taken over by another PCT. The Department of Health has recently set out how it will reward high performing PCTs (access to additional funds, flexibility over non-executive appointments, lighter touch performance management and the opportunity to take over underperforming PCTs). It is not clear whether such carrots and sticks are sufficient to drive performance. Other factors such as skill deficits resulting from the lower status and pay of senior managers in PCTs compared to equivalents on the provider side may be a greater hindrance to performance.
An approach that has been adopted in the Netherlands and Germany, and is occasionally floated in England, is to allow people to choose their purchaser. Emerging evidence from the Netherlands suggests that since the introduction of insurer competition, insurers have reduced their own administration costs, but are still struggling to achieve efficiency and productivity savings on the provider side ( personal communication). It will be interesting to see whether further evaluation of the Dutch system confirms these early results. Choice of purchaser brings with it a range of challenges and is unlikely to be a panacea particularly in the age of austerity.
There has been a long and chequered history of purchasing organizations in England with frequent changes and reconfigurations. There is currently a debate about the value of purchasing and the future shape it should take including the role that the private sector should play. 5, 6 The evidence from both the past experiences of purchasing in England 7 and international evidence 8 is inconclusive, and suggests the ability of purchasers to extract value from providers is highly variable. Purchasers world-wide need to share best practice if any of them are to become world-class. 
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